China’s J-35A courting buyers barred from US F-35s

This month, the China Morning Post South (SCMP) reported that China released a scale model of its last fifth general fighter, the J-35A, in the 55th Air Show in Paris.

The exhibition, organized by the Import and Export Export Corporation of China National Aero-Tecnology (CATIC), marked the first abroad appearance of the Shenyang aircraft corporation developed abroad and occurs in the middle of a Chinese strategic impulse for more sales.

First fly in September 2023 and initially designed for operators operations, the J-35A is positioned as the second fifth generation plane of China after the J-20 restricted by export. According to reports, Catic has sacrificed 40 units to Pakistan, which, if they conclude, would potentially be the first foreign sale of the platform.

Together with the J-35A, Catic promoted the J-10CE of 4.5 generation, which is already operational in Pakistan and, according to the reports, was used in May during the Sondoor operation of India, where it demolished at least the combatants of the Rafale de la India.

China’s JF-17, developed jointly with Pakistan and used by Azerbaijan, Myanmar and Nigeria, was also exhibited at Paris Air Show.

The air energy showcase highlights China’s intention to capitalize on geopolitical divisions and defense associations to expand their fighter exports, participulate in southern Asia and the Middle East, in the midst of the growing demand for advanced and competitive costs.

Saudi Arabia is a case in question. Unable to acquire the F-35 manufactured in the United States and distrust the US conditions attached to air sales, Riad can see China’s J-35 as an attractive coverage amid increasing doubts about the long-term commitment of the United States with the security of the Gulf.

The United States has refused to sell its F-35 frontline fighter to Saudi Arabia, given Washington’s legal obligation to maintain Israel’s qualitative military advantage (QME) in the region.

Guy McCardle informs in a Sofrep article in December 2024 that the United States refuses to sell F-35 to Saudi Arabia due to deep concerns about technological safety and geopolitical alignment.

At stake, he writes, is the patented F-35 software, which includes the source code that remains controlled by the United States, leaving Saudi Arabia depending on the US.

Hey, also warns that the integration of F-35 with China Saudi Air Defenses could compromise the plane’s stealth and intelligence capabilities.

While Saudi Arabia has sought participation in the global global combat air program of the United Kingdom-Japan (GCAP), scheduled to enter the service in 2035, delays in development in the program could raise issues of when Saudí Alt. Saudi Arabia can consider J-35 as part of a broader coverage between the United States and China.

According to the data of the International Peace Research Institute of Stockholm (Sipri), Saudi Arabia was the largest American weapons buyer, which represents 12% of US weapons sales. UU. In 2024.

Ghulam Ali, writing in the China-United States approach, observes that 70-80% of the arms of Saudi Arabia come from the United States, a dependency that aligns with the interests of both countries, although at a cost.

He explains that American weapons are exenses, the exchange of technology is limited and the terms are subject to political changes every four years. Crucially, he points out that the thesis comes with attached political strings, which restricts its use in certain theaters.

Elizabeth Dent and Grant Rumley, writing in September 2024 Defense One, tell how the sales of ee. UU. UU. To Saudi Arabia in 2021 with the condition that her resumption is Woubrite Hunicon.

They point out that Saudi Arabia responded by stopping its air campaign, participating in peace negotiations led by the UN and committing themselves to the training aimed at reducing civil damage.

Dent and Rumley argue that the United States sank the dependency of Saudi Arabia of the F-15 and patriotic missile systems to exert political pressure, demonstrating that the sales of weapons of the United States are not unconditional, but tools of political influence.

That the US movement. The need for alternative suppliers whose arms come without political conditions may have impressed.

Fuad Shahbazov writes in the Gulf International Forum that China quickly moved to capitalize on the dissatisfaction of Saudi Arabia with the USA, offering advanced drones and ballistic missile systems, the weapons that the United States is eiteizing to provide to be presented to provide to provide to provide to be provid. Weapons industry.

Even so, he warns, China cannot replace the United States as the main safety guarantor of Saudi Arabia. He points out that Althegh Arabia Saudi has looked for China to influence Iran to stop hutis attacks in the Red Sea, China is reluctant to get tangled up in a larger conflict in the Middle East and be careful not to damage its close relationships with Iran.

However, US exports from the UU. Saudi Arabia may not calm the fear of abandonment when they face internal disturbances or a determined Iran to retaliate with representatives, drones or potential nuclear weapons, they should be eliminated. Regional ITSTSSSTSSSSTIJLD.

Oliver John, writing in a June 2025 report for the Gulf International Forum, argues that the memory of the United States that abandons the Egypt Hosni Mubarak duration of the Arab spring of 2011 protests a sense of insecurity to the Saudi regime.

You observe that Gulf leaders are increasingly playing the United States “pivot to Asia” as a strategic retirement of the Middle East, a vision reinforced by the impulse of the United States for energy independence.

John adds that Althegh, the Trump administration courted Saudi Arabia in 2019, his failure in responding to Iranian attacks against Saudi oil infrastructure that deepened the same doubts throughout the Gulf about the credibility of us.

Ultimately, the importance of Saudi Arabian defense elections does not lie in itself from the United States or China, but how to use those tools to influence their regional diplomacy with Iran, Israel and other regional actors.